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The Windsor paradox 07 Apr 2026

The British monarch, King Charles III, rolled out the red carpet as he hosted Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to a banquet at Windsor Castle on 18 March 2026. For the scheduled event to proceed, the Nigerian leader had to jet out of his country while the blood of its citizens had scarcely dried on the streets of Maiduguri, Borno State, after multiple suicide blasts by terrorists claimed life and limb. Nonetheless, President Tinubu revelled in the pomp and circumstance of the royal dinner in London, so much so that he claimed during his toast that the occasion was a historic first for any Nigerian leader.

He was wrong. The reception accorded him during his state visit to the United Kingdom was not novel. In May 1989, the King’s mother, Queen Elizabeth II, hosted the then-Nigerian military Head of State, Gen Ibrahim Babangida, in the same royal home. Therefore, the reception of Tinubu fell more into a historical pattern than into the historic. Both Nigerian leaders are among the least popular among the citizens and yet the most honoured by Britain. This suggests that for the UK, the acceptability of Nigeria’s leaders is determined not by the pulse of the Nigerian people, but by the strategic utility of the Nigerian state.

Neither Babangida’s military authoritarianism nor Tinubu’s own in a democracy conforms to the values of popular democracy enshrined in the UK’s parliamentary system, which the UK's royalty and government espouse globally. This accommodation of divergence, often seen as betraying Britain’s hypocrisy, actually reflects the cold sophistication of the UK’s diplomacy. After retreating from its status as a preeminent global imperial power, the UK has maintained its status as one of the world’s most influential states while exerting geopolitical influence over former colonies that remain beholden to it.

The world’s major powers recognise Nigeria’s stature in terms of its large population, enormous mineral endowment, and its prospect for exercising geopolitical influence in the West African region. Therefore, the country has continued to command international attention since it gained political independence from Britain in 1960. While Nigerian leaders attract flattery because of the country’s strategic importance, they gladly serve the interests of the major Western powers. In exchange for a "red carpet" that overlooks their domestic failures, Nigerian leaders offer a gateway for foreign interests to entrench themselves in the local economy.

The scramble for Nigeria will intensify as the shift from multilateralism to selective bilateral arrangements sees even the Eastern economic and geopolitical juggernauts join the fray. In a more constructive sense, Nigeria is also vital to the “solution countries” framework in meeting global demands for energy and critical minerals. Sadly, these relationships are not meant to be equitable. Nevertheless, Tinubu is gleeful in his embrace of hegemonic power structures. This helps him tighten his grip on power in Nigeria, seemingly indifferent to whether it eviscerates the country.

The terror blasts in Maiduguri marked a new cycle of escalation of Nigeria’s long-running security crisis. The more his government budgets to counter insurgent terrorism, the worse it has grown. And the more the administration sees the need for external support, the more it provides a gateway for foreign powers into the country under the guise of security assistance. On the economic front, President Tinubu has had to accentuate the macro-micro divergence, as is fitting for the imperial agenda. Under him, Nigeria is pursuing a debt-fuelled economic growth model that enriches international bondholders—and their Nigerian counterparts.

To signpost progress, Nigeria’s external reserves grew to $50.45 billion in February 2026. The GDP is forecasted to grow by 4.49%, and the naira exchange rate has stabilised, albeit at three times the level seen in early 2023. Official inflation figures have also significantly trended downward. But micro-realities at the household and small-business levels are harsh. While Nigeria’s macroeconomic data now look promising in London and New York, poverty continues to accelerate at home. The projection is that 62%, circa 141 million Nigerians, will live in poverty in 2026.

The debt capital strategy's culpability is reflected by the N15.52 trillion—approximately 30% of total expenditure—allocated to debt servicing this year. Its purpose is to maintain Nigeria’s international creditworthiness. Meanwhile, the debt-service cost exceeds two times the combined value of budgetary allocations to health and education. With low public spending on vital social services, the country is locking in low economic productivity for decades. Therefore, more Nigerians will continue to grow poorer while the government continues to cite improving macroeconomic indicators. To sustain the paradox, the government must secure external validation as it grows more unpopular with local voters.

Nigeria’s democratic ideal is ultimately undone by externally focused economic reform instead of inward-looking strategies. With the former, the government does not need to work hard for the people and make itself accountable to them. Rather, the president can engage in strategic geopolitical arbitrage. The UK visit, especially its timing, has now exposed the calculated geopolitical exchange between domestic hardship and international validation.

Thus, Tinubu declared to his royal audience: “As one of the largest nations within the Commonwealth, Nigeria looks forward to contributing constructively to the continued growth and vitality of this global community.” But this community does not include the underserved Nigerian populace. 

Nigeria has always been a responsible member of the world’s community of nations. But its leaders have been less so to the people they are meant to serve. In my forthcoming book, Youth Breed: How Generations of Nigerian Youth Impact Their Country, due for release in June 2026, I enumerated the path to national renewal.