Jide Akintunde, Managing Editor/CEO, Financial Nigeria International Limited

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Nigeria’s peculiar gerontocracy 18 May 2026

Ten months before Nigeria’s 2027 general election, the presidential race has already taken shape. This is neither because President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has consolidated power three years into his first term, nor because opposition party primaries have taken place: they haven’t. It is because whoever wins the presidential election will almost certainly be a gerontocrat presiding over Nigeria’s entrenched gerontocracy—the rule of the elderly.

In 2019, young and middle-aged Nigerians accounted for 81 per cent of registered voters, while citizens aged 60 or above made up no more than 7 per cent of the total population. With septuagenarian then-incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari and former Vice President Atiku Abubakar as leading contenders, a clamour for a youthful president defined that year’s presidential election. Yet, as I wrote in my forthcoming book Youth Breed: How Generations of Nigerian Youth Impact Their Country, scheduled for release in June 2026, that agenda was roundly defeated. The prospect of a youthful president has since been extirpated from Nigeria’s medium- to long-term political horizon.

Since 2019, power has increasingly concentrated among the elderly. Unlike Presidents Umaru Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan, who assumed office in their 50s, or President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was 62 in 1999 when he became the country’s civilian leader, today’s political landscape offers no prospect of a president this young. Indeed, since 2015, Nigeria has been governed by successive septuagenarians, with cabinets and leadership across the legislature, judiciary, and key institutions dominated by figures who, on average, were more than three times the nation’s median age of about 18.

Nigeria is not a de jure gerontocracy. On the contrary, the 2018 Not Too Young To Run Act lowered the minimum age for elected office. In practice, however, an enduring feature of the Fourth Republic is the subordination of the rule of law to electoral outcomes and governance. This reality has reinforced the distinctive character of Nigeria’s de facto gerontocracy.

Unlike several African countries, such as Uganda and Cameroon, where incumbent presidents assumed office young and have since ruled for decades, Nigeria has seen one elderly president succeed another within the constitutional term limits. In the United States, the median age is 38.5, less than half that of the president and Congress. In Nigeria, the gap is far wider. A youthful population is being governed by an ageing elite. This mismatch continues to fuel intergenerational tension. This tension erupted most tragically in the brutal suppression of the #EndSARS protest in 2020.

Nigeria’s democratic gerontocracy is not an extension of Africa’s traditionally patriarchal leadership. Modern democratic institutions have replaced or subjugated traditional structures of governance. Like their forerunners, however, these modern institutions also concentrate privileges in the hands of leaders, now predominantly elderly, largely sidelining the youth. What makes Nigeria’s gerontocracy even more peculiar is the scale of its excesses. The leaders preside over the world’s largest population of poor youth while enjoying unmatched spoils of office.

The country has arrived at this sorry pass not necessarily by happenstance, even if not by design. A conspiracy of civic neglect and structural rigidity has entrenched the nation’s gerontocracy. Reflexive youth abstention from voting has created a leadership vacuum, filled by those with whom they cannot connect—separated not only by age but also by an archaic library of ideas. Meanwhile, aspiring politicians must navigate a gauntlet of power rotation, rigid hierarchies, and prohibitive campaign costs, often reaching top positions only after their prime years have passed.

Research by Raul Magni-Berton and Sophie Panel (2021) found that older leaders do not outperform younger ones; in fact, they often perform worse. Other scholars argue that, because older leaders are constrained by short biological and political horizons, they prioritise short-term gains over long-term transformation. This effectively counters the ‘experience premium’ argument that rationalises elderly leadership. Moreover, studies also find that older leaders deter foreign investment, as foreign investors seek stability and predictability. Together, these dynamics form a debilitating economic combination whose continued impact on Nigeria’s already fragile economy is not just unimaginable but institutionally corrosive.

How can Nigeria break the cycle of elderly leaders presiding over economic and institutional decline? Doing so requires two distinct yet inextricably linked imperatives. First, it is crucial that the next president be as young as possible—ideally, the youngest among the current major aspirants—to finally bridge the country's staggering demographic divide. However, a youthful candidate alone is insufficient without the second imperative: a robust and unprecedented youth turnout in the 2027 election. These two forces must work in tandem; a young leader provides the relatable platform, while a clear youth mandate provides the political leverage to compel that leader to prioritise the needs of Nigeria’s burgeoning young population, thereby establishing new benchmarks for elections and governance.

Yet, as I argue in Youth Breed, a president alone cannot transform Nigeria. The youth must embody the 3Ds—Dignity, Duty, and Discipline—which I recommended in the book, thereby exemplifying the integrity they demand of governance. By modelling these virtues and pressing for accountability, the youth can shift the national discourse from personality to ideology, prompting a unified vision for national progress.

Nigeria’s gerontocracy is not destiny; it is the logical, albeit unfortunate, consequence of civic neglect, unbridled ambition, and weak institutions. However, that trajectory can be reversed. The responsibility now lies with the youth to mandate a different direction for the country in 2027.

Jide Akintunde, Managing Editor of Financial Nigeria publications, is the author of the forthcoming book Youth Breed: How Generations of Nigerian Youth Impact Their Country, due for release in June 2026.