Funmilayo Odude, Partner, Commercial and Energy Law Practice (CANDELP)

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Who should hold telcos accountable for poor service quality? 17 Nov 2026

On 21 October 2026, the House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee investigating the persistent poor quality of telecommunications services in Nigeria directed the Chief Executive Officers of MTN Nigeria, Airtel Nigeria, Globacom, Mafab Communications, and other major operators to appear before it on 28 October. The committee further directed the Nigerian Communications Commission to ensure full compliance and warned that any chief executive who failed to honour the invitation would face a possible summons for arrest to compel their appearance. 

The committee's chairman framed the exercise as an accountability intervention on behalf of Nigerian consumers, whose experience of dropped calls, failed data connections, and deteriorating network quality has grown measurably worse even as the operators they patronise continue to report substantial revenues from their Nigerian operations.

The frustration that gave rise to the resolution is legitimate. Telecommunications is not a luxury in the Nigeria of 2026. It is infrastructure. It supports financial transactions, healthcare delivery, education, commerce, and the basic daily communications of over two hundred million people. 

From regulatory records, Nigeria's broadband subscriptions reached 109.6 million by January 2026. Records from financial institutions show that the NIBSS instant payments platform processed N284.99 trillion in a single quarter of 2025 across networks whose quality directly determines whether those transactions complete or fail. When those networks underperform, the consequences are not simply inconvenient. They are economically and socially material. Lawmakers who want accountability over this are not wrong.

The question is not whether the House of Representatives should concern itself with telecommunications service quality. The question is whether the mechanism it has deployed is constitutionally sound, and whether deploying it in this form helps or hinders the consumers it claims to protect. On both counts, the answer is uncomfortable.

Sections 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are the provisions under which the National Assembly conducts investigations. Section 88(2) defines the purposes for which those powers may be exercised. There are two: first, to enable the legislature to make or amend laws with respect to matters within its legislative competence; and second, to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it. 

Section 89 then sets out the procedural powers available for the purposes of any investigation conducted under the section, including the power to summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence or produce documents, and to issue a warrant for the arrest of any person who refuses to attend.

The constitutional structure is clear from the provisions. The investigative powers of the legislature are not general. They are purposive. They exist to support legislation and to expose administrative failure in the management of public funds and the execution of laws. They are not a general supervisory authority over private commercial conduct. They are not an alternative dispute resolution mechanism for consumer complaints. And they are not a substitute for the enforcement functions assigned to executive agencies by statute.

Nigerian courts have been substantially consistent on this point, though the precise scope of the powers has been contested across multiple cases. Justice Oguntade, now a retired Supreme Court Justice, interpreting the equivalent provision in the 1979 Constitution before the Court of Appeal in 2003, held that any invitation by the legislature to any person outside the purposes defined by Section 88(2) is invalid. The Courts have also held that private companies do not fall within the category of persons contemplated by Sections 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution in the context of oversight investigations into private commercial affairs. The decided and pending suits on this issue speak to how often the National Assembly invokes these powers in circumstances that private sector organisations consider unconstitutional, and how often those organisations have had to seek judicial relief.

The investigation into the service quality of the telecoms operators is not directed at exposing corruption or waste in the execution of any law that the House of Representatives enacted. It is directed at the commercial performance of private companies in a regulated sector. Whatever that exercise is, it is not straightforwardly within the purposes specified in Section 88(2). And the arrest power under Section 89, which is designed as a coercive tool within a constitutionally legitimate investigation, cannot cure the constitutional insufficiency of the investigation it is being used to support.

The constitutional argument is important in itself. But there is a second and equally significant reason why this approach fails consumers, which is that it substitutes institutional theatre for institutional accountability in a way that leaves the actual problem unaddressed. Nigeria already has a legal and regulatory framework for telecommunications service quality. The Nigerian Communications Act of 2003 established the NCC as an independent regulator with a statutory mandate to promote the interests of consumers, ensure the provision of qualitative and efficient telecommunications services, and enforce compliance with licence conditions and service standards. 

The NCC’s Quality of Service Regulations, most recently revised in July 2024, set out approximately 50 key performance indicators covering call drop rates, call setup success rates, network congestion, and data service quality. Enforcement of those Regulations commenced in November 2025 after operators were given a transition period to upgrade their infrastructure. The NCC has imposed pre-enforcement notices on major operators for breaches of those standards, with potential penalties estimated at approximately N12.4 billion currently moving through regulatory processing. 

In April 2026, the NCC directed mobile network operators to compensate subscribers affected by persistent service failures through automatic airtime credits, calculated on the basis of each subscriber’s average spending and their location in areas where service quality fell below specified benchmarks. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC), which has concurrent jurisdiction over consumer welfare in regulated sectors, has its own tools for addressing unfair commercial practices affecting consumers.

None of these institutions and instruments was referenced in the House committee's resolution. The committee directed the NCC to ensure that telecoms CEOs comply with its invitation. It did not ask the NCC to account for whether its own enforcement of the Quality of Service Regulations has been adequate. It did not ask why, given that those Regulations have been in force, network quality has continued to deteriorate to the point that a legislative investigation became politically necessary. It did not direct the FCCPC to report on whether it has exercised its consumer protection jurisdiction in the sector. It summoned the private companies that their statutory regulators are already supposed to be supervising, and threatened their executives with arrest for non-appearance.

This sequencing matters. The NCC has been criticised by the House itself for weak regulatory oversight. A motion of urgent public importance sponsored by Representative Ahmadu Jaha in an earlier session described telecommunications as critical infrastructure whose quality had failed to keep pace with rising subscriber demand, and accused the NCC of regulatory complacency. Without deference to the points made, the appropriate response to regulatory complacency is not to bypass the regulator and summon the regulated entities directly. Instead, it is to summon the regulator to account for the complacency, examine whether its statutory powers are adequate, and, if not, legislate.

A proper constitutional legislative intervention would begin with the NCC and the FCCPC, not the telecoms operators. There are questions to be addressed, such as whether the Quality of Service Regulations 2024 are being enforced at the pace and with the consistency that the scale of non-compliance requires; whether the penalty thresholds in those Regulations are set at levels sufficient to incentivize compliance, or whether they have become an acceptable cost of doing business for operators generating revenue in the hundreds of billions of naira annually; what resources, powers, or legislative amendments the NCC requires to discharge its mandate more effectively; and whether the framework for direct subscriber compensation introduced in March 2026 has been implemented in practice or remains a policy directive awaiting operational effect.

These are questions about the execution of laws within the National Assembly’s legislative competence. They are questions about whether public regulatory institutions are discharging their statutory mandates. They fall squarely within the purposes specified in Section 88(2). And, crucially, the answers to those questions are the ones most capable of producing a regulatory environment in which service quality actually improves, because they engage the institutions with the tools to compel improvement.

If the investigation reveals that the NCC lacks adequate powers, the House can legislate to provide them. If it reveals that penalty thresholds are inadequate, it can legislate to raise them. If it reveals that regulatory independence is being compromised by executive interference, it can legislate to address that. These are the outcomes that the legislative process is designed to produce. 

The House of Representatives has correctly identified that something has gone wrong in Nigeria's telecoms sector. But it has misdirected its instinct for accountability. The constitutional framework is not an obstacle to protecting consumers. It is a guide to doing so effectively. Following it would serve Nigerians better than circumventing it.

Funmilayo Odude is a Partner at Commercial and Energy Law Practice (CANDELP).