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Can Tinubu have a grip on federal power? 11 Jun 2023

Twenty-four years after he became Lagos State governor on 29 May 1999, Bola Tinubu was inaugurated as the 16th Head of State of independent Nigeria. He has become Nigeria's sixth civilian president with executive powers, after Presidents Shehu Shagari, Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Yar'Adua, Goodluck Jonathan, and Muhammadu Buhari.

President Tinubu assumes office under very controversial circumstances. He achieved his electoral victory in the February 2023 presidential election by polling just 27.5 percent of the total votes. His opponents are still in court to challenge his narrow victory in the election that local and foreign observations said was flawed. By securing only 11 percent of the votes of eligible voters, his mandate is, indeed, very flimsy.

Nigeria's democracy is young. It offers little in history, and even littler in democratic experience for the political leaders. When Tinubu was elected as Lagos State governor, it was only the third time in the history of the state that it would have a democratically elected governor. The previous two elected governors – Lateef Jakande (1979-1983) and Michael Otedola (1992-1993) – had just a combined five years in office. Outside of that, Lagos had eight military administrators appointed by military regimes.

Nevertheless, Tinubu has shown that he is an astute and shrewd political player that is self-taught. After serving as two-term governor, he found a way to maintain a firm grip on the politics of the state for the 16 years leading to his being elected as president this past February. All the governors of his era have faded into relative obscurity after finishing their tenures.

But while Tinubu may be envied, he is hardly loved in circles larger than the coterie of his political benefactors and foot soldiers. His control over Lagos has been described as ‘state capture’. Through a variety of means, including bribery, corruption, and intimidation, he exercised control over the institutions and resources of the state for his personal aggrandisement and long-term ambition of becoming president.

Before arriving at the presidency, Tinubu’s political influence extended to the Southwest of the country. As a renowned dealmaker, he built a strong and loyal political machine that used a range of ethical and unscrupulous means to put his lackeys into public offices in the region. A visionary, of self-interested type, he also supported many politicians into federal offices, together with getting Buhari elected in 2015. Without his vast reach in Nigeria’s institutions that bought into his cause, it would have been almost impossible for him to pull off his improbable electoral victory this year, starting with securing the ticket of the ruling party, APC, against all odds.

The question, or worry, now is whether he would be able to replicate his grip on the politics of Lagos at the federal level as president. Would he, or can he, capture the federal politics, transforming from a provincial kingmaker to a national one? Would he allow national institutions to function as they are statutorily designed to do? Would he exert control on federal resources to continue to feather his political nest? Can he disable the political opposition and dissent by civil society? Would he be leading the country into fascism?

Tinubu’s presidency, even after the election, remains a worrisome prospect. According to data from the Lagos State Debt Management Office, in 1999, the total debt of the state government was N13.1 billion. But as of early 2023, the debt profile of the state had increased to N500 billion, which represents a 3,805.9 percent increase. However, the combination of the high debt and the huge internally generated revenue of the state has not had commensurate positive impact on the infrastructural stock to drive business and personal living in Lagos. A report from the International Centre for Investigative Reporting says that the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) Lagos Chapter makes more than N100 billion yearly. The informal tax collection, with ample accountability loophole, was allowed and encouraged because the union serves as the muscle for Tinubu’s political intimidation. As the Commander-in-Chief, he now controls state-sanctioned institutions for violence. How might he use that power?

Tinubu also has a long relationship with the vibrant media of the ‘Lagos axis.’ From being an ally of the media in the mid- to late-1990s as a prominent figure in the agitation for the restoration of democracy, following the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, Tinubu has been more inclined to muzzle the press as he gained and solidified his political power. Safe for the social media, there should be genuine concern about whether the media can play their traditional – and also constitutional – role as the watchdog to the government.

Another area of anticipation concerns the nature of the relationship that is likely to exist between the Tinubu presidency and the private sector. Buhari largely disengaged from the private sector, unlike his predecessor governments of the PDP. Based on his antecedents in Lagos, Tinubu, who is a self-styled ‘progressive’, may nevertheless want to continue control over business, even as the government is a major spender and consumer. The personal control, which is not the same as ideological, statist economic leaning, would have implications for fair competition – which is critical for driving efficiency in business and the economy.

But despite being an astute and a formidable power player himself, there are factors that can effectively constrain President Tinubu’s influence. It could prove quite difficult for him to exert political control on a nationwide scale, compared with how relatively easy it was to do so regarding Lagos.

For starters, Nigeria’s diversity comes alive in federal governance. Although the northern governors helped him to secure the presidential ticket of the ruling party ahead of the presidential election, the north on occasions like this only sees itself as temporarily ceding power. It is unlikely going to allow Tinubu to consolidate power to its detriment.

While the President would have the north as a political heavy weight to contend with, he really doesn’t have a countervailing support from the south. According to the results announced by INEC, Tinubu lost in Lagos; his victories elsewhere in the south were either contentious or quite isolated. By also losing key northern states including Kaduna, Kano, Kastina, and Sokoto, President Tinubu starts on a political back foot and is vulnerable. But as a shrewd dealmaker, he is likely to make concessions that would help him within the ruling party. Such horse-trading would be more difficult with the opposition party politicians who know his government is politically weak and unpopular across the country.

The President will also struggle to get his agenda passed in the National Assembly. The opposition parties have a combined 223 seats, which translates to 47.7 percent of the 469 members of the National Assembly (NASS). While the opposition does not have a majority in either the Senate or House of Representatives, it nevertheless is able to hinder the achievement of a two-thirds majority needed to get bills passed. And like Bukola Saraki as Senate President was an effective check on President Buhari during his first term, although they were of the same party, Tinubu himself understands that he could have the leadership of the NASS as a bone in his throat. Hence, he has shown more than a passing interest in who becomes Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives.   

It would be a welcome development if the opposition can, on account of its relatively strong number in the legislature, and the electoral threat it poses in the off-cycle elections, make the presidency to be accountable. This will be a win for the country’s democracy — as opposed to allowing a tendentious civilian autocracy to take root.

Some other ways that the government can be held accountable includes oversight hearings and investigations. A vibrant opposition can make this happen. Also, the government would have to be more considerate in appointing senior government functionaries that require senate confirmation. Having political loyalists fill positions that require technocratic competence would likely meet resistance by the opposition in the National Assembly.

In conclusion, Tinubu’s presidency looks set to witness relentless face off with the opposition and civil society organisations should it survive the judicial challenge of his victory in February. This is not necessarily a bad prospect, but the situation has to be handled with wisdom and deference to the constitutional guarantee of the citizen’s freedom of expression and assembly to avoid it boiling over.

How personally active Tinubu would be in his government remains to be seen. His health conditions could limit his ability to impose himself. Instead, he may charge his appointees to deliver stellar performance that can easily endear him to the people and draw a positive contrast from the atrocious eight years of the Buhari presidency. This is a different approach from his hubris as the godfather of Lagos politics. But it is very difficult to predict what a formidable political actor such as President Tinubu would come up with, given his ability to deal or fight.

Cheta Nwanze is Lead Partner at SBM Intelligence.