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In this interview with the Editorial Board of Financial Nigeria, Mark Schroeder, Vice President of International Operations at Stratfor, a global geological analysis company, speaks on geopolitical tensions in Nigeria in the context of the one-year anniversary of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration.   
    
Financial Nigeria Editors: Your visit to Nigeria is into the week of the first anniversary of the administration of President Buhari. What were the first impressions that you got of Nigeria that had a symbolic power transition 12 months ago?

Mark Schroeder: Thank you Jide and to your team for welcoming me to Nigeria. It is great to be back in the country and it is great to be with you to discuss Nigeria one year on from the transition to President Buhari’s APC (All Progressives Congress) government. I think the timing of my visit is exceptional giving the number of issues that are developing within Nigeria right now.

My preliminary observation was to ask myself: How is Nigeria faring one year on under President Buhari? One goal that President Buhari set out for was to seriously commit resources to the counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram. We can say with confidence that very considerable gains have been made against the militant group to the point that Boko Haram no longer controls any meaningful territory in North-Eastern Nigeria.

This is a notable achievement given how Boko Haram had conquered vast swathes of territory and razed vast number of villages across that region over a year ago. I think that was a requirement President Buhari clearly understood from the part of the international community when he was campaigning to be president. He understood that he would receive considerable international support in exchange for devoting a lot of government attention and resources to the counter-insurgency operation.

Beyond that, it is less clear the achievements made during his first year in office and my observations during my visit so far is that there is a lot of uncertainty, hesitation, and concern. There is a perplexity over the direction of decision-making by the Buhari government.

Indecision at the federal government level has caused considerable concern and degraded confidence in the marketplace and in the government of President Buhari.

FN Editors: In your view, was there a general misreading of the economic outlook in which the West thought a key agenda for Nigeria was that of security as opposed to economic management? Were there common mistakes made, both on the Nigerian political side and the international community in supporting a government that has unfolded like it has done in the last one year?

MS: That is a pregnant question. The international community, particularly the West, was gravely concerned over the threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigeria’s national security. There was also the regional security concern posed by Boko Haram together with other militant groups in Africa, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, ISIS in Libya, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

This weighed heavily in the minds of the international community as they observed the campaign leading up to the election and the promises made by the two principal candidates, Buhari on the one hand and former President Goodluck Jonathan on the other.

But as we look to Nigeria now, with the Boko Haram threat largely contained, we can reflect and realise that many other concerns for Nigeria as a whole which were minimized during the campaign season have now loomed large. There is now a high degree of consternation that the direction of Nigeria is unclear, and that is to include the threat posed by Boko Haram.

FN Editors: Let’s stay with security. As it unfolds, the security victory against Boko Haram is zero sum. As the Nigerian government was degrading Boko Haram, we were seeing the reemergence of militancy in the Niger Delta region and even beyond, and we also have the Fulani herdsmen menace with the slaughter of people across the Middle Belt and the Southern parts of the country. With the same negligence the previous government addressed Boko Haram, we are seeing unstrategic security response to the militancy. How do you define security progress in Nigeria?

MS: Well, progress was made against Boko Haram and that progress will be sustained as long as the government shows an interest to do so. What we have seen is regression in other zones of the country and this is quite concerning. The rise in Fulani herdsmen violence across the Middle Belt and in the south of Nigeria is causing untold loss of life and it appears little effort is being made by government authorities to protect human lives from the conflict.

As we observe trends in the Niger Delta region, there is even little confidence within the region towards the federal government to respect the concerns of the oil producing region. This is a significant departure from previous engagement with the Niger Delta.

We have seen this resurgence of militancy in the region. We have seen threats and ultimatums from groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers. We have seen militants prove their sophistication and capability by disrupting hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil production per day. We have also seen that the response by the authorities has been minimal. The concern from the Niger Delta is that they no longer have a respectful partner to engage with at the federal level.

The awareness of energy security threat in the Niger Delta is a concern vaguely understood by the international community like in the way Boko Haram was perceived to be in the lead-up to the last election. But in terms of the impact on the Nigerian economy and the Nigerian state, energy security matters have a profound impact.

FN Editors: The U.S. is probably happy that the candidate it backed is now in government. What does this mean for Nigeria-U.S. relations?

MS: Within the United States foreign policy imperatives, the U.S. has geopolitical interests in Nigeria that are distant and peripheral. But generally speaking, we can say the U.S. has security concerns whether it is at national, regional or energy level. During the lead-up to last year’s election, the United States was gravely concerned about the threat Boko Haram presented to national and regional security. At the time of the 2007 election, the U.S. was closely concerned about the threat that Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) presented to energy security in the region and beyond. But the global oil market today is in a vastly different position than it was in 2007. This presents an opportunity and a risk to Nigeria.

In 2007, the risk of MEND disrupting a million barrel of oil production per day was of considerable concern to the U.S. in terms of what that meant to tight oil markets and tight pricing. But today, with the glut in global oil and gas supply, a million barrels of Nigerian crude being disrupted is only of tertiary interest to a world awash in supply of oil and gas. It will not significantly disrupt global supplies.

What that would do to the Nigerian economy would, however, be of grave concern to citizens and lawmakers in Nigeria. The possibility of reactionary violence to that potentially disruptive hit to the Nigerian economy should raise concern for government stability and security. This is what policymakers far outside of Nigeria would be forced to reckon with.

The U.S. wants to see a balance of power in Nigeria that avoids escalatory domestic violence. During the 2015 election, there was escalatory violence in North-Eastern Nigeria as a result of concerns with the PDP (People’s Democratic Party) government. In 2007, there was escalatory violence in the Niger Delta in response to control from political groupings outside the Niger Delta.

Moving forward, if what happens is rising escalatory violence in response to President Buhari’s policymaking, and if we see rising escalatory violence in the context of Fulani herdsmen, a resurgent Niger Delta militancy, and violence in other zones of Nigeria, we will see the United States make impersonal shifts in its relations with a government enabling escalatory violence. United States geopolitical interest is to ensure a balance of internal power that minimizes domestic conflict. And while there may have been perception that President Buhari was the appropriate response to the Boko Haram militant violence, if President Buhari, in his policy choices, instigates reactionary violence in other zones of the country, there will be a recognition that imbalance of power needs to be corrected. In other words, seceded; in other words, a single-term Buhari.

The focus on Nigeria in the mind of the United States and the United Kingdom, leading up to the 2015 election, was that Boko Haram was out of control and Jonathan was incapable of responding to it. He was solely focused on the elections. Whether Boko Haram was manipulated by Buhari, that’s another issue. But the perception was that Jonathan was incapable of responding to this serious national and regional security concern. But Buhari was going to be the effective solution. What have we seen? He has handled Boko Haram. We saw in 2007 how MEND was causing mayhem and disrupting oil production. What was required was a new political dispensation that could resolve the Niger Delta militancy. That got Jonathan into the Vice Presidency and the Presidency and it resolved that national security concern. Right now, Buhari solved one thing in one period of time, but if that has created an imbalance and if it aggravates that imbalance even more over the next year or two, there would be political support to change.

FN Editors: Do you agree with the assertion in some quarters that military response to the militancy in the Niger Delta region would be wrong-headed and what should be the appropriate response?

MS: What does it take to blow up a pipeline? It doesn’t take a big capability. In fact, it is impossible to militarily protect every kilometre of pipeline that crisscrosses the Niger Delta. If militants feel aggrieved, they will be able to cause incidents and disruptions within the region and a military order by the federal government to check the avengers will be unable to protect the oil infrastructure.

What I think is required is a comprehensive engagement in understanding the political and economic interest of the oil producing region. What is happening right now is a perception in the region that they are being persecuted and the region is being subjected as victims of political reprisals by a new government.

A comprehensive engagement approach will be to have a conversation – a stakeholders’ conference, if you will, where material interest can be shared. Military consideration is only going to be short-sighted and ineffectual.
 
FN Editors: How concerned should the international community be about the downturn in the Nigerian economy? In the first quarter of 2016, GDP contracted by 0.36 percent, the highest figure in 25 years?

MS: In the short-term, from the standpoint of a geopolitical analysis of Nigeria, the country can absorb any shock to the system. But the medium-term concern for Nigeria is that there is simply a reversion to the very same factor that caused widespread discontent and political opposition to the Jonathan-led government. We have not seen a fundamental change in circumstances other than a replication of circumstances with different leadership figures. What we must be concerned about as we look towards the medium-terms, and indeed the long-term of Nigeria’s geopolitics, are the concerns of ever-increasing centralisation of power, ever-increasing political exclusion, favouritism, and hoarding of resources.

We are beginning to see not just those trends emerge but opposition to those trends and this is only the first year of this government in power – a government who has a four-year term and whose general expectation is to complete two terms in office.

As we look into the medium and long-term, we should anticipate growing opposition to the circumstances of perceived monopolization of the resources of state.

FN Editors: President Buhari also has an anti-corruption agenda he is very committed to. However, it has failed to convince because some people feel it is partisan and it is being waged at the expense of the economy. What do you make of the anticorruption agenda of the government?

MS: Certainly, there is a very strong perception that the anticorruption agenda waged by President Buhari is selective and vindictive towards his political opponents in the previous Jonathan-led government. Buhari is single-handedly pursuing a reprisal campaign to penalize his political opposition. Whether rightly or wrongly, this is causing considerable concerns and indeed destabilisation within the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole. Addressing anticorruption by solely selecting members of the Jonathan-led government raises fears and raises reprisal violence. We can see the results of this play out in the Niger Delta today.

And so the question arises: How does one address corruption concerns without instigating fears that this is simply a tool of political violence against your opponents? Perhaps, putting in place some kind of model that addresses political reconciliation is necessary. This system can address corruption at an institutional level and at the same time assure members of the previous political dispensation that they are not being unjustly isolated, targeted and penalized.

FN Editors: How can the Nigerian market benefit from the geopolitical analysis of Stratfor?

MS: That is why I am here to meet with you, our partners at Financial Nigeria so that together we can create geopolitical analytics solutions for the Nigerian marketplace. This will ensure that our combined insights can speak to the demands that both the corporate Nigerian world and public institutions require.

Geopolitical insights into the imperatives and constraints of various actors is something that we extensively work on at Stratfor. Stratfor is a global geopolitical analysis company headquartered in Austin, Texas. Our Africa and Nigeria operations are only one subset of the geopolitical forecasting we provide for the principal markets around the world.

Stratfor’s geopolitical forecasting refers to analysis developed through a methodology that comprises political, economic, geographic, and historical understanding of the imperatives and constraints within a system. Such analysis is useful for building a forecast for decision-making whether for business purposes or policy preferences.

I would say the geopolitical objectives and constraints of stakeholders in Nigeria including political institutions and militant bodies in the Niger Delta is something that Stratfor invests considerable geopolitical thinking into.

Stratfor welcomes our partnership as a means to providing that analysis to the corporate Nigerian world and the Nigerian government community.