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Africa's regional integration is still work in progress 10 Aug 2015

'Solidarity' is, in theory, the guiding principle underpinning the interaction of African states and peoples in the post-colonial era. Founding documents for the African Union (AU), to which 54 African states belong, commit to greater unity, political and socio-economic integration. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) pledged to the creation of free trade areas and customs unions abound across the region's almost one-billion-strong population and 30.1-million km2 geographical area.
    
This principle is etched in our political history by virtue of the independence struggle, as well as the most commonly encountered ideals and symbolisms across Sub-Saharan African countries. Of course, in practice, the existence of African solidarity, or otherwise, is full of nuance, outright contradictions, moments of progress and retreat. This article will touch on some of the key markers.

Disheartening xenophobia

In April of this year, violence directed at migrants from [other] Sub-Saharan African countries spilled out in South Africa. At least seven people were killed and hundreds displaced after attacks broke out in Durban and Johannesburg. This tragic saga, not the first of its kind, has strained relations, particularly between South Africa and Nigeria, at an official level and in the public discourse. At the heart are themes of poverty, inequality, competitiveness, competition and identity with which we should all be familiar. Although South Africa boasts of 3.6 million people removed from poverty via fiscal policy, the poorest 40% of the population account for only 6% of income, according to the World Bank; and 80% of the population receive only 30% of income.

The desperation and disappointment fomented by those dynamics gave rise to violent demands for higher wages in the mining sector as well as the xenophobic violence. The perpetrators interviewed on news stations almost uniformly claimed that they were protecting their communities from competition for jobs and income from unfairly advantaged foreigners. As far as they were concerned, it is the lack of jobs and income that provoked the tension; it is the lack of jobs and income that must be addressed to prevent a repetition.

However, there are regions of the world where stagnant or falling income is not followed by xenophobic actions and utterances. How are the far-right doing in Greece today? What was the economic backdrop for “Ghana must Go” in Nigeria in the early 80s, or the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969?

Nevertheless, governments of targeted groups felt compelled to 'act'. Nigeria recalled its diplomatic representative and an unpleasant exchange of words followed. Some South African political figures appear to have contributed to a culture of afrophobia. For example, small business development minister, Lindwe Zulu, after the killing of a 14-year-old Somali boy in 2014 responded by demanding foreign Africans remember that they are in the country “as a courtesy” and should “share their practices with local business owners” [to avoid such animosity presumably]. The attacks themselves were prefaced by comments from the Zulu traditional leader, Goodwill Zwelithini, although he claimed he was misinterpreted. And looking forward, the probability of sporadic spikes in xenophobic tensions will remain high over the medium term as long as the economy does not deliver for the bulk of the population.

Our analysis would fall short if we did not note the horror that many South Africans have felt at the targeting of other Sub-Saharan Africans. Anti-xenophobia demonstrations in Durban drew thousands. Leaders like the poet, Keorapetse Kgositsile, and opposition Democratic Alliance leader, Mmusi Maimane, spoke with the kind of emotional fervour that reaffirms indigenous South African bonds with the rest of the continent. But the more often these violent attacks occur, and the greater the sanction of afrophobia by public officials, the more damage to African solidarity and the AU's stated aim of economic and political harmonisation.

Common front against affronts

Notwithstanding the above unfortunate incidents, and the cynicism they inspire, there are myriad examples of African nations acting in concert inside and outside the structures of the AU, African RECs and the United Nations.

At the time of writing, Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali government forces were announcing a joint initiative against the terrorist group, al-Shabaab, and Ugandan officials were in Burundi to mediate in Burundi's political crisis on behalf of the East African Community (EAC). While the sight of Ugandan president of the last 29 years, Yoweri Museveni, as EAC mediator, raises eyebrows -- to say the least -- let us not throw the baby out with the bathwater. The AU Commission Chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, has been outspoken in her criticism of Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza's drive to stay in office beyond the two-term limit. Nigeria, which is the largest economy and most populous nation on the continent, recently had an exemplary exchange of power from incumbent to opposition, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seriously considered adding presidential term limits to its charter before being blocked at the last minute by opposition from some of its members – Togo and Gambia, particularly. ECOWAS was a positive influence in Nigeria's electoral conduct and is now heavily involved in the restoration of constitutional government in Burkina Faso.

There are challenges to the democratisation narrative on the horizon. Although presidents Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame may be running for office again in Uganda and Rwanda, respectively, political pluralism is still in  ascendant. Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea are all scheduled to go the polls in the next 18 months or so. There are rumblings of constitutional amendment in these countries and others such as Congo-Brazzaville. However, rather than questioning democratisation as an African ideal, we should read in them the fact that norms around term-limits, voter registrations, election conduct and limits on executive authority on the continent are a work in progress. It is also important to note that developments like the former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre, who is now facing trial in Dakar, Senegal at the request of the AU for lives taken during his 1982 - 1990 administration, have never been the norm.

Economic cooperation

Here too, we are robbed of a simple narrative. On the one hand, policymakers routinely espouse the value of economic integration; while on the other hand, free trade is a fearful prospect for interest groups whose concerns may not easily be ignored – of necessity creating winners and losers in the market place, creative disruption around well-entrenched bureaucracies and substantial infrastructural investment costs. As a result, harmonisation targets are missed and fanfare is followed by tedium.

On the side of fanfare, last month, members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the EAC, with the exception of Libya and Eritrea, were reported to have launched their Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). It is a vast terrain as can be seen in the accompanying figure, covering more than half of Africa's estimated 1 billion population. Now, the tedium: In fact, TFTA signatories have agreed to, at some point, in some way, conclude negotiations on tariff arrangements and trade/market protocols between member states (who must then ratify the agreement in order to be bound by its terms). It is difficult to put a timeline on when this might be achieved.



ECOWAS was created in 1975 with an eye on regional integration from the outset and now, its Vision 2020 boldly dedicates members to the creation of a “borderless” region. Nevertheless, harmonisation deadline after harmonisation deadline has been missed. Of the four primary convergence criteria detailed below, very few of the 15-member nations are on target:
1.    A fiscal deficit less than or equal to 4% of GDP
2.    Central bank financing of the fiscal deficit that is less than 10% of the previous year's tax revenue
3.    Gross international reserves greater than or equal to 6 months import cover
4.    Single-digit inflation
    However, we must be mindful of the baby alongside that bathwater. ECOWAS has recently made significant strides forward by way of a common external tariff (CET) – under which there are five tariff bands from 0% for social goods to 35% at the top end. Nigeria began implementation last month. ECOWAS monetary union (beyond the francophone states) is a distance away given the lack of movement on convergence criteria but the region has undoubtedly moved a step closer to the creation of a real customs union.

Common Survival

“Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you”; so spake Kwame Nkrumah, and by that analysis we should perhaps expect integration to be slow. The political kingdom is exceptionally difficult to find. Founding fathers of the modern African states launched the 'solidarity' project before they reached consensus on how far it should go. It remains a work in progress.

In the final analysis, the scope is too broad, and too diverse. Recent 'xenophobic' violence is an undeniable tragedy but one that has occurred at the same time that ECOWAS is promoting shared values of constitutionalism and democracy; EAC and AU mediating in Burundi; joint action against violent Islamist militancy, and the piecemeal advance of regional economic communities.

Moreover, the time frame for the African solidarity project is too long. We are a long way from the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Yet a lot of challenges sit on the horizon, many of which must reinforce the region's instinct to think in continental terms on such issues as climate change, economic partnership with the European Union, shared threats from religious extremism and inadequate infrastructure.